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NOTES
EXTENT OF NON-CUMULATIVE SHAREHOLDERS' CLAIM OF PRIORITY UPON CURRENT EARNINGS WHERE PAST EARNINGS ARE KEPT

IN SURPLUS-The rights of holders of non-cumulative preferred
shares of stock, a security picturesquely referred to as the "waif" of
the stock exchanges,' have undergone some critical examination. 2 As
a result, the a priori assumption implicit in the older cases that preferred shares which have been labelled "non-cumulative" may never
receive the benefit of any earnings, once a dividend period has passed
without a dividend declaration,3 has now largely disappeared. Of
course any differences between preferred and common shares rests
ultimately on contract, and the extent of any variation between them
as to dividend distribution is basically a question of construing those
contracts.4 The modern tendency of the law has been characterized
'Berle, Non-Cnmelative Preferred Stock, (0923) 23 COL. L. REV., 358.
The need for re-examination was first expressed by Berle, op. cit. supra
note I, reprinted in BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPOnTE FINANCE (1928)
92 et seq. It is an interesting commentary on the significance of periodical
literature as a growing factor in Anglo-American jurisprudence (Cf. CAanozo,
GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924) 13) that after the publication of that article,
and as the author confesses "perhaps as a result of the publication" a number
of cases (which will be referred to in this note) followed in rapid succession.
It is not certain that the doctrine announced by the author was accepted in
every case, but it is certain that a clearer analysis of the interest of noncumulative preferred shareholders in earnings has been achieved. For annotations of these decisions see the following notes: (1927) 27 COL. I- REV. 53;
(1925) 23 MIcH. L. REV. 779; (1925) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 605; (1925) I VA.
L. REV. 553; (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 657; recent cases: (1925) 25 COL.L. ZEv.
231; (1925) 14 GEORGETOWN L. J. o9; (925)
38 HARV. L. REv. 686; (1925)
ig IL.L. REv. 460.
'Hazeltine v. B. & M. L. Ry. 79 Me. 411, 4o, io Atl. 328, 332 (1887);
Burke v. Ottawa Gas & Electric Co. 87 Kans. 6, 123 Pac. 857 (1912). A
note in (1926) 11 CoRN. L. Q. 23o, at 233, makes the same assumption.
CONYNGTON, CORPORATION PROCEDURE (I927) 370, indicates that if the
shares give greater rights they are not "strictly" non-cumulative. He attributes
the results reached in recent cases to "defective wording of the creating provision" which has given some of the shares a hybrid nature.
This assumption is the rationale of the rule generally enunciated that
courts are more likely to compel a declaration of dividends where the preferred shares are non-cumulative than when they are cumulative. See I Coox,
CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) 92a; I MoRAwnnz, PRIVATE CoRPOuRATIO NS (2d ed.
1886) § 459.
'See for example, Lyman v. Southern Ry. Co. 149 Va. 274, 141 S. E.
240 (1928). To ascertain these contractual rights the charter provisions, by-laws
and certificate clauses must all be considered. Continental Ins. Co. v. Minn. St.
P. & S. M. Ry., 283 Fed. 276 (D. C. Minn. 1922) aff'd, 90 Fed. 87 (C. C. A.
8th, 1923). A clear statement, envisaging the possibility of a corporate surplus being built up, would prevent any litigation such as that involved in this
note. Thus in the consolidation agreement involved in Continental Ins. Co.
2
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as a swing back to a standardization of relations and contracts so as to
remove the result as far as possible "from the control of the accident
of power in individual bargaining." 5 That the clear enunciation of a
standard in this type of case is still a desideratum of the law is emphasized by the divergent judicial opinions concerning non-cumulative
preferred shares in Barclay v. Wabash Ry. Co.'
In that case, holders of preferred A shares were entitled under
the charter provision "to receive preferential dividends in each year
up to the amount of five percent before any dividends shall be paid
upon any other stock of this company; but such dividends . . . shall
be non-cumulative." The company for a number of years earned more
than sufficient to pay five percent on all of this class of shares outstanding, but full dividends were not declared. The net earnings so
withheld were carried as a surplus account and expended in permanent
improvements and extensions, which working assets the company still
owns and maintains. In 1927 the corporation had large net earnings.
It thereupon announced a dividend policy of paying five percent to
preferred A shares and five percent to junior shares each year "out of
earnings and surplus," and declared such dividends out of that year's
earnings. Preferred A shareholders brought a bill to restrain the payment of this dividend, and to enjoin payment of any dividend to the
junior shares 7 until the preferred shares were first paid dividends to
the extent that they were not paid five percent in past years, though
there were sufficient earnings to make such payments. The federal
district court dismissed the bill, but the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decree and granted the relief sought.
v. Minn. St. P. & S. M. Ry., supra, there is an express denial of any interest
in earnings not actually distributed as dividends. But the clause in the re-

organization agreement involved in Continental Ins. Co. v. U. S., 259 U. S.
156, 42 Sup. Ct. 540 (1922) providing (at 178) that "no dividend shall in

any year be paid upon such stock out of net profits of any previous fiscal year
in which the full dividends shall not have been paid on the first and second
[non-cumulative] preferred stock" leaves unsettled the exact question raised
in this note. The cases arose however on quite a different point.
'Isaacs, Standardivafio; of Contracts, (1917) 27 YALE L. J. 34. An

analogous study attempting to evolve a standard for determining the preferred shareholders' right to participate with common in dividends is contained in Thompson, Respective Rights of Preferred and Common Shareholders i Surplus Profits (1921) 19 MICH. L. REv. 463.
'30 F. (2d) 260 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), rev'g 23 F. (2d) 691 (S. D. N. Y.,
1928). Certiorariwas granted March II, 1929.
The junior shares was Preferred B shares, convertible into common shares,
and common shares. Since their position with regard to Preferred A shares is
identical, they will be referred to merely as common shares.
Difficult problems beyond the scope of this note may arise in any case
as to what are "net profits" for a year. Income bonds, and securities with
return contingent on earnings have given rise to this kind of litigation. For
discussion of the problem as to whether profits include anticipated but unrealized
gains see Park v. Grant Locomotive Works, 4o N. J. Eq. 114 (1885) (guaranteed dtividend); REITER, PaorrTs, DIVIDENDS AND THE LAw (1926) passin.
As to distribution of losses in allocated surplus see BERLE, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 124 et. seq.

NOTES

The decision of this case involved two questions: (i) whether the
non-cumulative shareholders had any interest in the corporate surplus
made up of earnings in prior years, but reasonably and fairly withheld
for corporate purposes; (2) whether that interest, if recognized, was
such as to require the payment of all back earnifigs attributable to noncumulative preferred shares, out of current earnings, before the common shares could receive any dividend. The various answers given on
the basis of the same "dividend clause" illustrate the difficulty of forecasting the result in this type of litigation. The district court answered
the first question in the negative, making a consideration of the
second question unnecessary. In refusing to recognize that the shareholders had any interest in withheld earnings, it differentiated all the
decided cases that did recognize such interest on the ground that the
specific contracts and statutes present required such construction.
The majority opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, in reaching its
conclusion, necessarily answered both questions in the affirmative. No
argument seems to have been made upon the second point, and when
the court was presented with the alternative of depriving the shareholder of all his interest in past earnings or granting the relief, it chose
the latter. , The dissenting judge8 inferentially answers the first question in the affirmative for there is a concession that "if the directors
propose to reduce working capital accumulated out of past earnings
they would probably be obliged to declare as preferred dividend the
amount so withdrawn." But his answer to the second question is emphatically in the negative. Two reasons are given. The first is that
literal interpretation of the charter clause "which limits the declaration
out of earnings of any year to five percent" precludes any other conclusion. The second is that the situation does not reasonably make
necessary the process of "gratuitously marshalling the proposed common dividend against earlier earnings and using current earnings to
make up the deficit so created"; which means that even though there
may be an allocated or "earmarked" portion of surplus attributable to
the preferred shares, its existence does not give rise to a "dividend
credit" or priority claim equal in amount which must first be satisfied
before any junior shareholder can take any part of surplus.
With regard to the first question little more need be said than
that it hag been generally conceded that, in absence of a controlling
clause requiring a different result, "non-cumulative preferred shareholders acquire inchoate rights up to the amount of earnings which
might have been, but were not, used to pay their dividends." ' The
gist of the arguments in support of such a theory is as follows: to deny
the right has fraud possibilities and from the business and economic
"Mr, Justice Learned Hand was the dissenting judge. An indication of

his attitude with regard to this type of shares was given in American Brake
Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Railways Co. (S. D. N. Y., 1925) unreported. The language of Mr. Hand is quoted and apparently misconstrued
in Blarx, op. cit. supra, note 2 at lo9 n.
1Bm, op. cit. supra note 2, at I14.
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view is not reasonable; 10 the word "non-cumulative" does not require
a denial of such rights;" to deny such rights is to give into the control of the board of directors the power of determining which group
of all the associates in the enterprise shall enjoy the benefit of any dividend-earning period. When thus confronted with a rule which would
prevent the discretion of the board of directors from increasing the
common shareholders' participation at the expense of the preferred,
most courts capitulated,' 2 although13one jurisdiction flatly denied the
rule in absence of legislative action.
On the second question the affirmative answer has usually been
assumed as a corollary, by the protagonists of the "inchoate rights"
theory. 14 However it is apparent that the interest in a corporate sur" CONYNGTON, CORPORATE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT (4th ed. igig)
82, cGncedes that the existence of non-cumulative preferred shares, under the
view he takes, "is a standing inducement to the improper passing of dividends."
It is to remove such inducement that the rule contended for has been adopted.
The circumstances under which this type of share is issued varies. It may
be issued to the investing public for new money or may arise as a result of a
reorganization agreement, so that it is difficut to generalize as to the purpose
for which such stock is created. But it can be demonstrated that the "controller" of the corporation ordinarily has interests adverse to the non-cumulative
preferred shareholders, who may be mere investors often without voting rights.
Though it is sound policy to allow the corporation to withhold a distribution of
profits, permanent rights must be given in the accruing profits, or non-cumulative shareholders are at the mercy of the "controller."

'tThe lucid note in (1925)

34 YAix L. J. 657 explains that the word "non-

cumulative" does not negative necessarily the "right to arrearages" which is
perhaps the most striking of the cumulative shareholders' legal relations; it
merely negatives the right to cumulate each year the expectant interest in earnings for that year because in past years there were no earnings.
"Thus the directors are permitted in later years to pay to non-cumulative
preferred shareholders dividends out of withheld earnings, nunc pro tunc.
Bassett v. U. S. Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 539, 73 At. 544
(19o8); Moran v. U. S. Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co. 95 N. J. Eq. 389, 123
Atl. 546 (1924) aff'd, 96 N. J. Eq. 689, 126 At]. 329 (1925) ; Collins v. Portland
Electric Power Co., 7 F. (2d) 221 (D. Ore., 1923) aff'd, 12 F. (2d) 671 (C.
C. A. gth, 1926) ; see Morse v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., i6o N. E. 894 (Mass.
1928).

See also cases cited infra notes 2o, 24.

'Norwich Water Power Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., reported in ii Va.
L. Reg. (N.s.) 203 (Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 1925).
The language of the charter was such as to compel the decision, but the court
used language opposed to the principle under discussion. The opinion cites several law review articles which it supposes are arguments in favor of legislative
action that would prevent any type of non-cumulative preferred shares, but
that which would give the rights contended for. But it would seem that by
an enlightened judicial process, the desired result could be reached without
such legislation.
" None of the rules suggested by BERLx, op. cit. supra note 2, at 96 et seq.,
cover the situation. He supposes (p. Iio) "A courageous court could, presumably, thereupon inquire why it was impossible for the directors to protect
the holders of non-cumulative preferred stock by declaring a dividend in
stock, scrip or other paper, protecting the rights of these shareholders in surplus, but permitting the continued use of the funds. Or, putting it negatively,
the court might enjoin the distribution of these earnings as dividends on any
junior stock." (Italics are writer's.)

NOTES

plus which may preclude the possibility of enjoyment of this surplus
by any class of security but non-cumulative preferred, yet which may
be equally unavailable to that class until final distribution if surplus
remains invested until that time, is much different than the interest
which results in a corporate obligation whose redemption is contingent
on the existence of distributable earnings. To argue from assumed
definitions of the words "preferred" or "non-cumulative" is unfruitful, 5 in deciding which alternative is the correct one. Functionally
the problem is this: what group of associates shall be made to furnish
to the enterprise the additional working capital which will be used to
benefit the entire corporate group?
No decided case seems squarely to have decided the question. The
only pertinent English cases 16 involve dividends on preferred shares
"payable as regards each year out of the profits of that year only."
They substantiate the rule that the preferred shareholders' earnings
may never be used as increased capital for the corporate enterprise.
These cases in effect deny any discretion in the directors to withhold
dividends when there are profits for the year, hence they proceed on a
different theory from the American cases.
Of the American cases which involve non-cumulative preferred
shares, only those are pertinent which involve the right of the preferred shareholders to enjoin payment to the common shareholders
until withheld dividends are paid. The caseg refusing to compel the
board of directors to pay earned but withheld dividends involve an
entirely different legal right."7 Likewise those cases upholding the
In 74 U. oF PA. L. REv. and ii VA. L. REv, suprtz note 2, the contention
is that a "dividend credit" arises which must first be redeemed before any
other dividends are paid. The alternative rule is not considered. The problem
under consideration was given detailed and separate treatment in the note in
27 CoL L. REv., supra note 2.
"5"Preferred" shares mean no more than this: A particular portion of
the capital shares have been endowed with certain rights, privileges and limitations which other shares do not have. "Preferential dividends in each year"
may obviously -ither mean that the shareholder obtains an equitable interest
in all the earnings of a year up to the stipulated portion, or it may merely mean
that in any years the stipulated amount must be paid preferred stock before
common stock may participate. So also the word "non-cumulative" used alone
does not compel any single result.
Dent v. London Tramways Co. I6 Ch. Div. 344 (i88o) ; see Staples v.
Eastman Photographic Materials Co., [1896] 2 Ch. 303; Thornycroft & Co. v.
Thornycroft, 44 T. L. R. 9 (Ch. Div., 1927).
'The immediate unconditional right to receive a distributive portion of surplus in a going corporation is conditioned on a declaration of dividends by the
directors whose discretion will not be interfered with in absence of fraud or
unfairness, or a contract precluding discretion. A refusal to declare dividends
on non-cumulative preferred shares was upheld in New York, Lake Erie &
Western R. R. v. Nickals, 119 U. S.296 (1886); McLean v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. 159 Pa. 112, 28 Atl. 211 (893) ; Morse v. Boston & Maine R. R.,
supra note 15. The cases involving other classes of shares are collected in
6 FLETcHER, CYCLOPAEDIA CORPORATIONs (191g) 6o74, n. 77. In the following
cases a declaration of dividends on non-cumulative preferred shares was corn-
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power of the board of directors to pay back dividends in the face of
common shareholders' objections, 8 though they recognize some interest of the preferred shareholders in surplus, are not decisive of the
point in question.
In Norwich Water Power Co. v. Southern Ry.,19 the preferred
shareholders sought to restain payment on the junior shares of any
dividend, until earnings for prior years were distributed to the noncumulative preferred shareholders. The defense of the corporation,
that such earnings were lost to the non-cumulative shares when a
period passed without a dividend declaration, was sustained. The
withheld dividends were in the-form of fixed assets, and the injunction involved the distribution of current earnings, but this fact was not
considered under the theory of the court. In Day v. U. S. Pipe &
Foundry Co.,' 0 a preferred shareholder's bill was sustained enjoining
payment of dividends to common shares out of current earnings under
similar circumstances. A New Jersey statute involved 2 was construed as enunciating a legislative policy to have a type of security
"with many of the attributes of bonds." It was held that the obligation to pay the contingent-upon-profits interest on this type of security must be satisfied before common shareholders receive any dividends. Although some of the language of the court substantiates an
opinion that the same result would have been reached without the
2
statute,22 the case has been considerably discredited as an authority.
However, relying on that case, an injunction was granted in similar
circumstances in Collins v. Portland Electric Co. 24 There was no allegation that the withheld earnings were required in the corporate enterprise, and from the opinion it is impossible to ascertain the source
of the proposed dividend. The case may therefore either be an adoppelled: Burke v. Ottawa Gas Co., supra note 3; Star Publishing Co. v. Ball,
292 Ind. 158, 134 N. E. 285 (1922); Hazelton v. B. & M. L. Ry., supra note 3.
"See cases supra note .
' Supra note 13.
2095 N. J. Eq. 389, 123 AtI. 546 (924)
aff'd by divided court 96 N. J.
Eq. 736, 126 Atl. 302 (1925).
NEW JERSEY CO0^ORATION ACT OF 1896 § 18.
'" See the language of Backes, V. C., 95 N. J. Eq. at 393: "The statute is
nothing more or less than a definition of the equitable rights of the preferred
stockholders arising out of the company's obligation to pay the yearly fixed
dividend." But this language probamny refers to the later part of the statute
which requires the payment of not more than 8 per cent. per annum "before
any dividends shall be set aside or paid on common." The company's obligation under the statute is to pay a fixed dividend if there are earnings. The
right to enjoin payment to common before this fixed dividend is paid is therefore said to be a definition of this equitable right. Such interpretation of the
language makes the decision turn ultimately upon the existence of the statute.
But in Basset v. United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., supra note 15,
the statute was not relied on.
Norwich Water Power Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., supra note 13, at 216;
CONYNGTON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 371.
' 7 F. (2d) 221 (D. Ore. 1925) aff'd 12 F. (2d) 671 (C. C. A. gth, 1926).
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tion of the New Jersey statutory rule upon principles of equity, or if
the attempt was made to distribute withheld surplus, may merely constitute a holding that in the division of this withheld surplus, the
equitable interests of the various groups of shareholders must be
recognized.
The question has never been raised in the Supreme Court of the
United States, though a certiorari has been granted in the Barclay
case. In ContinentalInsurance Ca. v. U. S.,2" a case likely to be relied
on by either side to the controversy, the rights of common shareholders in surplus were examined. The case was an appeal from a decree
dissolving a combination as one in restraint of trade. In the distribution of assets of one of the companies involved, the common shareholders demanded, to the exclusion of preferred shareholders, all that
portion of the surplus made up of earnings which might have'been
paid to common shareholders (the preferred dividends having been
paid), but which were withheld for corporate purposes. The court
refused the claim on the ground that when the board of directors
failed to exercise their power to declare dividends, before dissolution,
26
all withheld earnings were to be distributed as assets in dissolution.
This case may decide nothing more than that even up to distribution,
the directors' discretion will not be interfered with, in the absence of
fraud. If so, the case is not pertinent to the present inquiry. On the
other hand it may mean that surplus will not be "earmarked" or
"allocated" according to the scheme of dividend distribution, the contract as to dividends merely -governing a distribution of each year's
earnings and nothing more. If this is the rule, it may be argued that
a fortiori the Court will not create a liert on subsequent earnings because of withheld earnings. On the other hand, it may be contended
that if the Court will not recognize allocation of surplus on dissolution, there are strong equitable reasons for allowing non-cumulative
preferred shareholders to claim priority as to current earnings in full
for withheld earnings, otherwise the whole priority of the preferred
shares becomes illusory.
From a practical point of view there are many considerations
that seem to favor the adoption of the rule in the Barclay case. If
the non-cumulative preferred shareholders are made to furnish the
additional working capital to the corporate enterprise, the only return
'Supra note 4.
'With regard to distribution the court sustained the contention that preferred and common share alike in absence of contract. However it may be
observed that with regard to "earmarked" surplus a distinctin can be drawn
between a going concern and one which is about to be wound up; so that
conceivably the court may not object to "earmarking" when it decides the
Barclay -Case. But common shareholders' claim to surplus in a going concern made up of earnings attributable to common stock have been denied.
Englander v. Osborne, 261 Pa. 366, 104 Atl. 614 (1i8); Lochwood v. General Abrasive Co., 21o App. Div. 141, 205 N. Y. Supp. 5H (1924) aff'd, 24o
N. Y. 592, 149 N. E. 719 (1925). See Stevens.v. U. S. Steel Corp., 68 N. J. Eq373, 59 Atl. 905 (19o).
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they receive is the greater assurance that their limited preference 27 is
realized each year. The detriment to them, besides the fact that there
is a postponed enjoyment of the earnings, consists in the danger that
the preferred shareholder is exposed to, in the form of business losses.
There is a reasonable argument that a class of shareholders which
has accepted a limited but more probable return, security-holders who
are more like lenders than entrepreneurs, should not be made to bear
such risks. Again, accounting difficulties are encountered when an
attempt is made to trace "earmarked" surplus from year to year, for
the physical property which represents surplus is repaired, replaced
and fluctuates in value. Furthermore, the right to cumulative dividends in years in which there are earnings is a legal relation which is
more familiar to the investing public than rights to an "allocated surplus," and one which courts are more likely to enforce when faced with
express contract provisions regulating the distribution on dissolution, or
permitting the corporation to redeem. It would therefore appear that
for ease in administration, for practical considerations, as well as because it is consistent with recognized legal principles, the rule of the
Barclay case will be generally adopted.
J. R. Cades.
Philadelphia,Pa.
COMMERCE CLAUSE RESTRICTIONS ON STATE REGULATION OF

MOTOR VEHICLE CARuIERs-Though the Commerce Clause 1 of the

Federal Constitution impliedly grants to Congress wide powers in
dealing with interstate commerce,2 it is well settled that the states may,
to a limited extent, acting under the residuum of powers which they
have not given up, pass measures directly affecting such commerce,
except where Congress, by the exercise of one of the granted powers,
has expressly or impliedly forbidden them. The clearest illustration is
afforded by the cases where peculiar local conditions necessitate special
governmental action of a non-regulatory nature, or special regulations over commerce.3 However, even where the conditions calling
for regulation are not restricted to particular states, so that a uniform
system of rules is undoubtedly preferable, still the failure of Congress
to provide such rules has been held to permit the states, where it may
be done in the exercise of their retained powers, to impose regulations
'This argument would not apply to participating shares. Cf. note (1929)
L. REv. 8o5.
'U. S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Clause 3.
2
BuRricI, AAERICAN CONSTITUTION (1922) 216-42. See, for example,
Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. I, 32 Sup. Ct. 169 (1912) ; Lottery Case, I88 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. 321 (903)
(illustrating the Federal
"police" power); Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342,
34 Sup. Ct. 833 (1914) (the power to regulate other matters affecting interstate
commerce).
aGilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713 (U. S. 1865); Cooley v. Port
Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U. S. i851).
42 HARV.
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of their own.' While the opinions have generally employed many
vague descriptions to denote the limitations upon such state action, 5 a
true statement of the rule would seem to be as follows: assuming that
they do not go so far as to discriminate against interstate commerce,'
state laws affecting such commerce are constitutional if they 7satisfy
these two requirements: first, that they constitute a reasoiable exercise of the police power 8 or some other conceded state power,9 and
secondly, that they do not unduly 10 disturb the public interest outside
the state. The latter requirement underlies the recognized rule that
the state cannot legislate where uniformity of regulation is necessary. 1'
To apply both requirements involves "a consideration of all the facts
and circumstances, such as the nature of the regulation, its function,
the character of the business involved, and the actual effect on the
flow of commerce." 12 The result will depend on the court's attitude
toward what is fundamentally a question of policy, and due to this, as
well as the unlimited number of factual situations, decisions have a
limited value as a precedent, except in the field represented by the
particular case.
It is the purpose of this note to examine the application of the rule to state legislation affecting interstate motor vehicle
carriers.
It is necessary first to discover what powers have concededly
"See 2 CooLE-Y, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
BURDICK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 244-48.

(8th ed.

1927)

1267-81;

'For example, a conclusive distinction is sometimes drawn between laws
which primarily regulate the manner of carrying on commerce, and those
which only affect commerce incidentally. For an interesting discussion of the
general utility of such distinctions, see Powell, Current Conflicts between the
Commerce Clause ad State Police Power (1928) 12 MINN. L. Rv. 321,
321-25.

An actual discrimination against persons engaged in interstate commerce
is necessarily invalid. Weimar Storage Co. v. Dill, 143 Atl. 438 (N. J. Ch.'
1928) (reasonable tax for use of highways levied only on interstate carriers
held unconstitutional) ; cf. Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245,
48 Sup. Ct. 23o (1928) (permitting a special tax on interstate carriers where
the intrastate carriers have been taxed for the same purpose in other ways);
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1875).
' See the Court's discussion of state train-stopping statutes in Lake Shore,
etc. R. R. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285 19 Sup. Ct. 465 (I898) ; and of blow-post laws, Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U. S. 310, 37 Sup. Ct. 640 (1917).

' See cases irfra note 36, for laws going beyond police power.
'As the power to fix intrastate railway rates, see Minnesota Rate Cases,
230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1913) ; as the power to build bridges, Gilman

v. Philadelphia, mipra; note 3; cf. cases infra notes 15 and 27.
" See infra note 4o for illustrations of undue disturbance.
n Minnesota Rate Cases, supra note 9, especially at 399-403 (containing a
complete review of the subject) ; Cooley v. Port Wardens, supra note 3.
Stone, J., in DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34, 43, 47 Sup. Ct. 267,
271 (1926).
ISBikle, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact (1924)
38 HARV. L.
Rav. 6, 9-11; Brandeis, J., in DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, supra note 12, 273 U. S.
at 37, 47 Sup. Ct. at 269.
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been retained by the states, and what kind of legislation is invalid as
an attempted exercise of one of the granted powers. The clearest state
power under which interstate motor vehicles may be regulated arises
from the fact that the highways are owned and maintained by the
states.14 It is often argued that this should permit the states to regulate or condition their use as they please. But state ownership has as
yet produced no extraordinary principles. It has justified a registration tax upon all motor vehicles using the state highways, as compensation for deterioration caused by such use, or in the nature of a
toll.' 5 By reasonable regulations, the weight of motor vehicles may
be governed,'- and their routes may be determined. 17 But beyond
measures like these, state regulation cannot be upheld under this source
of power.
It is conceded that the states have the power to protect the interest of the public in having their persons and property free from direct
physical injury. Speed ' 8 and safety appliance 19 laws may be passed,
qualifying tests and licenses may be required of drivers, 20 registration
of all automobiles may be required, 2 ' and a charge, no greater than
the cost of supervision may be made,2 2 regardless of the interstate
movement of the vehicles affected. The operators may also be required.to provide a bond or liability insurance2 8 to cover injuries caused
by the negligent operation of their machines. 3
A new and increasingly important element of public interest,
which the states have the power to protect, is to have the roads free
from congestion, so as to make possible an efficient use thereof. This
not only justifies parking and routing regulations, 24 but contains great
"The fact that Congress may have aided in the construction of roads does
not evince an intent that the states should not pass their own regulations. Morris
v. Duby, 274 U. S. 135, 143; 47 Sup. Ct 548, 550 (1927) ; Liberty Highway Co. v.
Michigan Pub. Util. Com., 294 Fed. 7o3, 7o9 (E. D. Mich. 1923).
I ' Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554, 47 Sup. Ct. 702 (1927) ; Kane v. New Jersey,
242 U. S. 16o, 37 Sup. Ct 3o6 (1916) ; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 61o, 35
Sup. Ct. 140 (1914); Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245, 48
Sup. Ct. 230 (1928).
" Morris v. Duby, supra note 14.

'See Penn-Jersey Rapid Transit Co. v. Camden, 142 Atl. 821 (N. J. 1928).
isErb v. Morasch, 177 U. S. 584, 20 Sup. Ct. 819 (i9oo) ; see Kane v. New
Jersey, Hendrick v. Maryland, both s-upra note 15.
"Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280, 34 Sup. Ct. 829 (914).

' Kane v. New Jersey, Hendrick v. Maryland, both supra note 15; New
York, etc. Ry. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 17 Sup. Ct. 418 (1897).
' Kane v. New Jersey, supra note 15; cf. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S.

352 (1927).
American Motor Coach System v. Philadelphia, T8 F. (2d) 991 (E. D.
Pa. 1927), aff'd, 28 F. (2d) 736 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928). See (1928) 52 A.
L. R. 533.
' Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 44 Sup. Ct. 257 (1924) ; It re Opinion
of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 6o6-7, 147 N. E. 681, 698 (1925).
" Penn-Jersey Rapid Transit Co. v. Camden, supra note 17.
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potentialities as a justification for legislation of a less local character.2 5 In the interest of the public convenience, the nature of service
of common carriers may be regulated, permitting reasonable rules as to
the routes interstate common carriers may take, and as to the number
of passengers they may carry. 28 The clear justification for all these
measures is the state police power.
The states concededly have the power to regulate the intrastate
business conducted by interstate carriers to the same extent as they
may regulate intrastate carriers, regardless of the effect on the interstate business of such carriers, except, possibly, where it would make
the interstate business entirely impracticable. 2" And, finally it is noteworthy that the states may under any of the powers heretofore discussed, impose on interstate carriers, as distinguished from vehicles
not being used for such business purposes, special regulations, 28 even
to the extent of exclusion, it would seem, if the congestion of the roads
should warrant it. 29
But another group of powers have clearly been relinquished to
Congress. Among these are the power to tax interstate commerce as
such,30 and those governmental powers which pertain peculiarly to
such business, like that of a common carrier, which is affected with a
public interest. So the state may not regulate interstate rates or competition. This principle dates from Gibbons v. Ogdenal and has
beer4 properly applied in the recent case of Buck v. Kuykendall, w'
which held that a state may not deny to an interstate carrier a certificate of public convenience granting the right to operate upon its highways, on the ground that adequate facilities for conducting interstate
' See infra note 47.
' Haselton v. Interstate Stage Lines, 82 N. H. 327, 133 AtI. 451 (1926);
Newport Electric Corp. v. Oakley, 47 R. I. ig, 129 AtI. 613 (1925). See (1927)
47 A. L. R. 2.30, (3927) 49 A. L. R. 1203.
27So a license may be required to permit the carriage of intrastate passengers. Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke Street Ry. Co., 273 U. S.45, 47
Sup. Ct 298 (1927), discussed in (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 565.
'A special tax may be imposed for use of the highways; Clark v. Poor,
supra note 1S. Special license laws, applying only to carriers, may be passed;
American Motor Coach System v. Philadelphia, supra note 22.
'See Frost v. Railroad Com. 271 U. S.583, 46 Sup. Ct. 6o5 (1926), inferring that certificates of public convenience may be required of private intrastate carriers. See especially dissent of Holmes, J., 271 U. S. at 6o0, 46 Sup.
Ct. at 6og, and Rosenbaum and Lilienthal, Motor Carrier Regulation (1926) 26

CoL L. REv. 954.

'A mere occupation tax is unconstitutional.
Sprout v. South Bend, 277
U. S. 163, 48 Sup. Ct. 502 (1928).
219 Wheat. i (U. S. 1824).
See Wabash, etc., Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U. S.

557 (886).
32267

U. S.307, 45 Sup. Ct. 324

(1925).

Maloy, 267 U. S. 317, 45 Sup. Ct. 326 (925)
Pac. 50 (925).

To the same effect, Bush Co. v.
; People v. Yahne, 195 Cal. 683, 235
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commerce already exist.3 3 While this decision has received considerable adverse criticism, 34 a contrary view could only be accepted upon

a new construction of the Commerce Clause. 3 Such regulation from
its very nature must be either uniform or non-existent. But even

where the regulation is primarily local, and country-wide uniformity
would not seem to be essential, still it may not be passed in the exercise of this group of powers. So, unless justified under the police
power, a state may not pass regulations for the convenience of those
dealing with interstate carriers, such as compulsory insurance laws to

protect the shippers of goods.38

It is now necessary to examine how state regulation under one of
the conceded state powers may be invalid on the ground that it unduly
affects the public interest outside the state, thus violating the second
requirement of the basic rule suggested. It is almost axiomatic that
while a state may regulate under its police power, it may not exclude,37
or impose conditions 38 upon the right to do an interstate business. To
illustrate from one field, the state may punish a broker who sells fraudulent steamship tickets,3 9 but may not pass license laws which would
permit the state to keep him from further pursuing this business. 40
It would seem to follow under such a principle that while a state may
ordinarily impose upon persons engaged in interstate movement the
same penalties for violation of its police laws as are imposed upon
those moving intrastate, 4 1 and so may punish an interstate carrier
whose drivers have consistently violated the speed laws, it may not
'But such a certificate may be required in order to confer jurisdiction, and
to impose reasonable rules and charges; provided it is granted to all who apply.
Newport Electric Corp. v. Oakley, supra note 26.
3
McReynolds, J., dissenting in Buck v. Kuykendall, and Bush Co. v.
Maloy, supra note 32, 267 U. S. at 325, 45 Sup. Ct. at 327; Strong, Constitutional

Aspects of State Regulation (1928) 3 TEMPLE L. Q. 17; Gavit, State Highways
and Interstate Motor Transportatiom (1927) 21 ILL L. REV. 559.

'Cf. the, ferry cases, where extraordinary principles have been applied
due to the local nature of .the business, to permit rate-fixing. Port Richmond
Ferry v. Hudson County, 234 U. S. 317, 34 Sup. Ct. 821 (1914). But the state
may not require a license. Mayor of Vidalia v. McNeely, 274 U. S. 676, 47
Sup. Ct. 758 (1927).

'Liberty Highway Co. v. Michigan Pub. Util. Com., supra note 14, at 708;
Michigan Pub. Util. Corn. v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 577, 45 Sup. Ct. 391, 193
(1925); McNeill v. Southern Ry., 202 U. S. 543, 26 Sup. Ct. 722 (i9o6),
Hall v. deCuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1877).
'Buck
v. Kuykendall, sUora note 32; Sprout v. South Bend, supra note
30, 277 U. S. at 171, 48 Sup. Ct. at 505; BURDICK, supra; note 2, at 246.
'International Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 30 Sup. Ct 481 (ipog).
"Cf. Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497, 45 SUp. Ct. 141
(1925).

'o DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, supra note 12. Nor may a state subject to its
license laws the agents of interstate express companies. Crutcher v. Kentucky,
14T U. S. 47, ii Sup. Ct. 851 (1890).
See Real Silk Co. v. Portland, 268 U. S.
325, 45 Sup. Ct 525 (1925); McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 3O4, 3O Sup. Ct.
88I (3890).
1 See cases supra notes 20 and 26.
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authorize a ruling taking from it the right to continue its business.4 2
Yet the Supreme Court of Ohio has recently upheld such a ruling.4 3
As merely a punishment for having violated the laws of the state, this
decision is not sustainable.41 It must be justified, if at all, as a quarantine measure in pursuance of the police power. But while a state may
pass inspection and quarantine laws, 5 and under this power may license automobile drivers, and exclude from operation any vehicles
over a certain weight, or improperly equipped, even though this may
result in the inability of a particular interstate carrier to carry on his
business, 46 the Ohio decision goes much further than any of the decided cases in that it permits the exclusion of an entire business from
interstate commerce. While the situation is factually a new one, it is
believed that this result is not warranted by prior cases.
It is conceivable, however, that the congestion of the highways of
a state may reach such a point as to make them comparatively useless.
Long before such a condition is reached, state ownership of the roads
will assume a new significance,4 7 and the public interest will be so
tremendously increased as to require the application of -new principles.
But as yet the courts do not recognize that such a point has been
reached.4 s Before they do, it is likely that Congress will legislate,40
and, by occupying the field, will greatly restrict even the present sphere
of permissible state activity.
S.F.
42 For various grounds for the revocation of licenses of intrastate carriers,
see Rosenbaum and Lilienthal, Regulation of Motor Carriers in Pennsylvania
(1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 696, 718-19.
' Detroit-Cincinnati Coach Line v. Public Utilities Com., 164 N. E. 356
(Ohio 1928).

"See, however, the court's language at 358: "We are of the opinion that
the right of revocation and prohibition is necessary to the maintenance of a
proper respect for state laws and state institutions." This is especially indicative of the real reason for the decision in view of the fact that the carrier
had apparently been primarily charged with unlawfully picking up intrastate
passengers. Such misconduct would not in itself justify the revocation of an
interstate license. See St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 35
Sup. Ct. 99 (19]4).
'R. and Nay. Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S.87, 46 Sup. Ct. 279 (1926):
CooLEY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1270-72.
"Morris v. Duby, supra note 14.
" Many more of the public interests would assume a strictly local character,
making the rule of Gilman v. Philadelphia, supra note 3, applicable. So the
state may clearly regulate the number of lines of poles or conduits installed
by interstate telegraph companies wishing to use its roads for such purpose.
Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Richmond, 224 U. S. 16o, 171, 32 Sup. Ct. 449, 452
(1911) ; City of St. Louis v. Western Union Teleg. Co., 148 U. S. 92, 98-99,
13 Sup. Ct. 485, 487-88 (1893).

" For opinion comtra, see supra note 34. See Frost v. Railroad Com.,
supra note 29, especially the dissents, to see how such considerations have influenced the decision of cases under the 14th Amendment.
" For possible and contemplated action by Congress, see Rosenbaum and
Lilienthal, szpra note 29, at 984.
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THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIABLE INTEREST COUPON AND ITS
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-For sixty years, since the much-quoted
case of City of Kenosha v. Lamson,' American courts have regarded
it as settled law that the statute of limitations applicable to a negotiable interest coupon is the same as that covering the sealed instrument, that is, the bond to which it is attached. 2 But in Dickerson v.
Wilkes-Barre & Hazleton Ry.,5 the New Jersey Court of Errors and
Appeals ignored the long line of unbroken precedents and decided that
the applicable statute of limitations is the shorter one governing simple contracts. This decision occasions an analysis of the problem of
the legal status of the negotiable interest coupon.
The coupon has been defined as "an instrument attached to an
interest-bearing bond, representing the installment of interest due at
a stated period." 4 Unlike the bond to which it is attached, it bears no
seal, 5 a circumstance which creates the problem of this note. The
coupon serves the double purpose, first, of enabling the holder to collect interest without presentation of the bond, and second, of allowing
176 U. S. 477

(1869).

2Kelly v. Forty-Setond St Ry., 37 App. Div. 5oo, 55 N. Y. Supp. io96
(1899); MacDowell v. North Side Bridge Co., 251 Pa. 585, 97 Atd. 97 (1916).
Cf. In re Cornwall Minerals Ry., [1897] 2 Ch. 74, occasionally cited for the
same proposition, but actually decided because the debt was "statutory." See
LIGHTWOoD, TIME OF LIMITATION OF AcTIoNs (igog) 195.
The unity of bond and coupon was so emphasized in the Kenosha case, that,
together with City of Lexington v. Butler, 8i U. S.282 (1872), it created the
erroneous impression that the statute of limitations did not begin to run against
the coupon until the bond matured. Meyer v. Porter, 65 Cal. 67, 2 Pac. 884
(1884), overruled in California Safe Deposit Co. v. Sierra Valleys Ry., 158
Cal. 69o, 112 Pac. 274 (igio) ; First National Bank of Greeley v. Park, 37 Col.
3o3, 86 Pac. io6 (igo6). Waln v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. R., 16 Phila.
21 (1883)., aff'd, 105 Pa. 195 (1883), is cited for the same view in 2 FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS (1917) § i06o, I. 45; and in Note,
ANN. CAS. 1912 A, 733. However, the situation does not arise in the case,

and the opinion is too general in its terms to be cited as dictum. See also
Williamsport Gas Co. v. Pinkerton, 95 Pa. 62, 64 (i88o). The clear majority
rule today is the logical one that the statute begins to run from the time the
coupon is due, as at that time the cause of action accrues. Koshkonong v.
Burton, 1O4 U. S.668 (1881) ; City of Galveston v. Loonie, 54 Tex. 517 (1881).
8iO3 N. J.L. 175, 143 Atl. 618 (1926). The decision was by a vote of
eleven to two.
'Kenosha v. Lamson', supra note I, at 483. See, for history of the coupon,
CHAMBER.AIN, PRINCIPLES OF BOND INVESTMENT (1911)

2.

The coupon may

take the form of bill, note, or check. City of Lexington v. Butler, spra note
2: Mercer Co. v. Hubbard, 45 Ill. 139 (1869); Arents v. Com., i8 Gratt. 750
(Va. 1868). But whatever its form, the coupon is generally given the effect of
a promissory note. Williamsport Gas Co. v. Pinkerton, 95 Pa. 62 (1880);
2 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (1913) § 1490.
5
ABBOTT, PUBLIc SEcuRnTEs (1913) § 183. Occasionally the "bond" like-

wise bears no seal, in which case the problem of this note does not arise. Such
a "bond" is merely a corporate promissory note with interest coupons attached.
Best v. Davis- Sewing Machine Co., 65 Hun 72, ig N. Y. Supp. 731 (1892).
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him to realize the interest due or to become due by negotiating the
coupon. 6
The negotiable coupon generally carries with it all the incidents
of the older negotiable instruments,7 e. g., negotiation by delivery or
endorsement," the superior rights of a holder in due course, 9 and
method of suit.10 However, upon the allowance of interest upon the
coupon after maturity,1' and also upon the allowance of days of
grace, 12 there has been less agreement.
The solution of our problem-which statute of limitations applies
to the coupon-depends upon whether the coupon is in law part of
the bond. Unfortunately the relationship of the coupon to the bond
has not yet been worked out with logical completeness.
From its very definition and purpose it is evident that the negotiable coupon is independent of the bond to the extent that it may be
negotiated separately, mature earlier, and be sued upon without reference to or presentation of the bond.' 3 Suit may be brought even without complying with the conditions recited in the bond."
0 City of Kenosha v. Lamson, supra note I ; Arents v. Com., supra note 4. To
fulfill the second purpose the coupon must be negotiable, and its negotiability
has sometimes been upheld even though words of negotiability were absent.
McCoy v. Washington Co., 3 Wall., Jr. 381 (C. C..3d, 1862). Contra: Woods
v. Lawrence Co., I Black 386 (U. S. i86r); Evertson v. Newport Natl. Bank
66 N. Y. 14 (1876). The latter decisions have been followed by a similar requirement of precise compliance with the negotiability requirements of the
Negotiable Instruments Law. King Cattle Co. v. Joseph, i58 Minn. 481, I98
N. W. 798 (924) ; Borough of Montvale v. People's Bank, 74 N. J. L. 464, 67
Atl. 67 (i9o7); BIGELOW, BIats, NoTEs AND CHECKS (3d ed. 1928) §54 n. I.
Contra: BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE IN sTRUMENTS LAw (4th ed. 1926) 7, 8;
Aigler, Recognition of New Types of Negotiable Instruments (1924) 24 CoL.
L. kEV. 563; Note (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 71; cf. Chaffee v. Middlesex R. R.,
146 Mass. 224, i6 N. E. 34 (1888), For general background, see Wright, Opposition of the Law to Business Usages (1926) 26 Co. L. REV. 917. The
English Bills of Exchange Act excluded coupons from its purview. CHALmERS,
BILLS OF EXCHANGE (Sth ed.) 362.
'2 DANIEL, op. cit, supra note 4, § 1oo.
8
City of Lexington v. Butler, supria note 2.
9Spooner v. Holmes, io Mass. 503 (1869).
"4 CooK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) 3516, n. .
' See infra notes 20, 21, 27 and 30.
' Days of grace were held applicable to coupons in Wood v. Consolidated
Electric Light Co., 36 Fed. 538 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1888) ; and in Evertson v.
Natl. Bank of Newport, 66 N. Y. I4 (1875). Contra: Chaffee v. Middlesex R. R.,
supra note 6; Arents v. Com., supra note 4. Cf. Alabama Mfg. Co. v. Robinson, 56 Fed. 69o (C. C. A. 5th, 1893); and McLoon v. Smith, 49 Wis. 200,
5 N. W. 336 (i88o), both distinguishable upon their facts.
"Bailey v. Co. of Buchanan, Ii5 N. Y. 297, 22 N. E. i55 (i889) ; Beaver
v. Armstrong, 44 Pa. 63 (1862).
" Manning v. Norfolk R. R., 29 Fed. 838 (C. C. E. D. Va. 1887). Of
course where reference is made in the coupon to conditions in the bond, they
are binding upon the bondholder. See McClelland v. Norfolk Southern R. R.,
nio N. Y. 469, i8 N. E. 237 (i888), where it was properly held that such conditions made the coupon non-negotiable.
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On the other hand, there are several clear links between the coupon and its bond. Where the bond is secured by a mortgage, the
coupon, even though detached, shares ratably in the mortgage." Furthermore, reference in a coupon to conditions in the bond, makes those
conditions part of the coupon contract, and if the coupon states the
contract imperfectly, the bond controls." The coupon is sufficiently
part of the bond to be affected by infirmities in its execution.1 7 The
law of sales recognizes that in the absence of express stipulation, unpaid coupons accompany the transfer of the bond.' 8 Finally, and
highly exaggerated in importance, is the fact that the coupon springs
from the promise to pay interest contained in the bond and rests upon
the same consideration.' 9
Yet none of the above features of a coupon conclusively shows
that it is part of the bond, and should parasitically receive the protection of its seal. Were a bond issued with no other provision for the
payment of interest than the simultaneous delivery of individual unattached promissory notes, maturing at semi-annual periods, the same
superficial connections with the bond would generally be present, yet
unquestionably, the instruments would be totally distinct at law.
The individuality of- the interest coupon is emphasized by the
fact that it draws interest after non-payment at its maturity, just as if
it were a separate instrument. This is the federal rule 2o and that
adopted by the great majority of the states." Yet in the majority of
large commercial jurisdictions, interest, not represented by2 a separate
instrument, does not draw interest after its non-payment.1
A peculiar intermediate view is that of the New York courts.
They consider the coupon, while it remains in the hands of the holder
Bailey v. Co. of Buchanan, supra note 13; Real Estate Trust Co. v. Penna.
Sugar Refining Co., 237 Pa. 311, 85 At. 365 (1912). The latter case declares, at
315, 85 Ati. at 366, "the holder of the coupon becomes equitably an owner of a
proportion of the bond."

le2

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§ 1050.
17

(1917)

BURROUGHS, PUBLIC SECURITIES (881)
582.
"Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Oregon R. R., 585 Fed. 639 (C. C. D. Ore.
1893); Fox v. Hartford & W. H. R. R., 70 Conn. I, 38 At. 871 (1897).
"This point is argued in the dissenting opinion in the Dickerson case, at 179,

143 At. at 619.

I Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 82 (U. S. 1868).
"Harper v. Ely, 70 Ill. 581 (1873); North Penna. R. R. v. Knight, 54
Pa. 94 (1867). For rate of interest, necessity of demand and burden of proof,
see 3 THOMPSON, CORPORATION (3d ed. 1927) § 2415.
"Leonard v. Villars, 23 Ill. 377 (i86o) ; Howard v. Farley, 26 N. Y. Sup.
308 (1865) ; Stokley v. Thompson, 34 Pa. 2io (1859). The payment of compound interest is never implied. Force v. Elizabeth, 28 N. J. Eq. 403 (1877).
Even an express provision for compound interest is invalid in some states if
made in advance. Lee v. Melby, 93 Minn. 4, ioo N. W. 379 (1904).
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of the bond, even though physically detached, to be a "mere incident
of the bond," 2 3 "a mere evidence of accruing interest," 24 its negotiability depending entirely upon that of the bond, 25 thus not an independent obligation,2 6 and therefore non-interest-bearing. 27 But when
transferred to one not the holder of the bond, the coupon becomes, under the New York view, a fully independent obligation, 28 free of the
conditions in the bond and mortgage, 29 bearing interest in its own
right,39 and losing the benefit of a third party's guarantee of the bond,
which before the transfer included the coupon.31
Three situations which have arisen in federal cases emphasize the
separateness of bond and coupon. In the first, 2 the court held the
amount of the interest coupon competent to be included in addition to
the amount of the bond to make up the sum necessary to give the federal court jurisdiction, even though the statute 3 3 specifically forbade
the inclusion of "interest" in the jurisdictional sum. Still stronger
evidence is presented by the second decision, to the effect that cancellation of the bond before maturity does not in any way invalidate previously negotiated coupons.3 4 The third significant decision was that
payment of a coupon does not stop the running of the statute of limitations against the other coupons or against the bond; 35 yet ordinarily,
Bailey v. Co. of Buchanan, supra note 13.
Hudson Valley Ry. v. O'Connor, 95 App. Div. 6, 88 N. Y. Supp. 742

(1904).

'Hibbs v. Brown, 112 App. Div. 214, c8 N. Y. Supp. 353 (io6), aff'd,
igo N. Y. 167, 82 N. E. i1o8 (19o7); Greene v. Minzesheimer, iio N. Y. Supp.
429 (39o8).
"Its obligation would have been precisely the same if no coupons had been
executed." Bailey v. Co. of Buchanan, suprar note 13, at 302, 22 N. E. at 156.
SWilliamsburgh Savings Bank v. Town of Solon, 13 N. Y. 465, 3z N. E.
1o58 (1893).'This view makes the status of the coupon somewhat similar to that of a
note payable to maker, which is not an instrument until indorsed to another.
See Arant, Notes Payable to the Maker (1927) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 29.
'Haskins v. Albany R. R. & Power Co., 74 App. Div. 31, 76 N. Y. Supp.

667

(1902).

' Long Island Loan & Trust Co. v. Long Island C. & N. R. R., 85 App. Div.
36, 82 N. Y. Supp. 644 (1903), aff'd, 178 N. Y. 588, 7o N. E. rio2 (i9o4).
But plaintiff must allege and prove that he is not a bondholder in order to recover interest upon the coupons. Klein v. East River Co., 33 Misc. 596, 67 N.
Y.

Supp. 922 (1901).

' Clokey v. Evansville & Terre Haute R. R., 16 App. Div. 304, 44 N. Y.

Supp. 63r (8W).

"'Edwards v. Bates Co., 164 U. S. 269, i6 Sup. Ct. 967 (I896).
325 STAT. 434 (1889), 28 U. S. C. §41 (1) (1926).
Clark v. Iowa City, 87 U. S. 583, 589 (3874); Miller v. Town of Berlin,
13 Blatchf. 245, 250 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1876); Griffin v. Macon Co., 36 Fed. 885
(C. C. E. D. Mo. 1888). A contrary view of the law upon this point is the
basis of one argument in the dissenting opinion in the Dickerson case, at 179,
i43 Atl. at 61g.
'New Paddock-Hawley Iron Co. v. Vayetteville, 207 Fed. 786 (W. D.
Ark. 1913).
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payment of interest arrests the running of the statute against the principal.3 6
It would therefore seem that in all but its more superficial aspects,
the negotiable coupon is independent of its bond. Therefore, it should
not share the seal upon the bond.
In arriving at this recognition of the separateness of the coupon,
New Jersey cases show a distinct progression. The original New Jersey view was that of the unity of bond and coupon, so that a statute
governing suits on a bond was held to apply to its coupons as well,
with the result that recovery upon the coupon barred the remedy upon
the already matured bond just as if they constituted one debt.3 7 This
decision was soon overruled, although doubt still remained as to the
allowance of interest upon the coupon.3" The next step freed the
coupon from the conditions in the bond, where the coupon was detached, even though still in the hands of the bondholder.3 9 Thereafter,
the coupon was recognized as an independent instrument bearing interest after maturity.40 The present Dickerson case 41 represents another step forward, the burial of the fiction of the "carrying over" of
the seal. One more advance remains to be made, the recognition that
it makes no difference. whether the coupon is detached or
on principle
42
not.
The Dickerson case finds further support in the present marked
tendency to accelerate the limitation of action, both by statute4 3 and
by judicial decision. An example of the latter is the choice of the
shorter tort statute to bar an action which arises from what is simultaneously a breach of contract and of tort duty." But admittedly, the
public policy behind that choice, arising from the impermanency of
the evidence, the difficulty of keeping witnesses available, and the danger of fraud, is absent in the case of the coupon. The evidence of the
coupon indebtedness is lasting. Practical considerations might favor
the corporation in its desire to have its unfunded indebtedness quickly
eliminated, as opposed to the interests of the habitually lazy investor
who allows his coupons to accumulate in a safe deposit box.
; Chestnut St
'Wallace v. Coward, 79 N. J. Eq. 243, 81 AtI. 739 (19i1)
Trust & Fund Co. v. Record Publishing Co., 227 Pa. 235, 75 AtI. io67 (igio).
Holmes v. Seashore Electric Ry., 57 N. J. L. i6, 29 AUt. 419 (,894).
Jones Co. v. Guttenberg, 66'N. J. L. 659, 57 At. 274 (igoz).
Mack v. American Telephone Co., 79 N. J. L. IO9, 74 At. 263 (igo9).
4 Fidelity-Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Wilkes-Barre & Hazelton Ry., 98
N J. L. 5o7, i2 At. 734 (7926).
SSupra note 3.
2 The physical connection or lack of it between bond and coupon should
not affect its legal status. Amy v. City of Dubuque, 98 U. S. 470, 476 (1878) ;
Williamsburgh Savings Bank v. Town of Solon, supra note 27; McDowell v.
North Side Bridge Co., 257 Pa. 585, 97 At. 97 (1914).
LIMiTATIoN OF AcTIoNs (3d ed. i9o6) 2.
"BANNING,
"Krebenios v. Lindauer, 175 Cal. 431, i66 Pac. 17 (917); Webber v.
Herkimer Ry., iog N. Y. 311, 16 N. E. 358 (1888).
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Should bond houses demand it, the corporation can give the investor the same assurance he had before the Dickerson case, by the
simple device of placing a seal upon each coupon and declaring.it a
specialty. But such a device will only serve to emphasize the growing
separateness of bond and coupon, and the tendency to interpret the
coupon solely by what appears upon its face.
E.M.

